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ESSAY
THREE VERSIONS OF TAX REFORM*
ALVIN C. WARREN, JR.t
My subject this afternoon is tax reform, which again rose to the
top of the U.S. political agenda during last year's presidential
campaign. My principal goal in this lecture will be to explore three
different versions of tax reform. In order to provide some context
for that exploration, I would like to begin by briefly comparing
taxation in the United States to taxation in other industrialized
countries, focusing on three attributes of a mature tax system.
The first attribute is the overall level of taxation. Although
rarely emphasized in American political discourse, the overall
level of taxation in the United States is much lower than in other
developed countries. In 1994, the most recent year for which com-
parative figures are available, the total of all taxes, including
social security taxes, at all levels of government in the U.S. was
27.6% of gross domestic product.1 Of the twenty-eight developed
countries that made up the membership of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), only Turkey
and Mexico had lower overall levels of taxation. The OECD aver-
age was 38.4% of gross domestic product, while the European
Union average was 42.5%.2
* George Wythe Lecture, delivered at the William and Mary School of Law on
April 10, 1997.
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REVENUE
STATISTICS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1965-1995 74 (1996 ed.).
2. See id.
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Turning now from the overall level of taxation to a second at-
tribute, the type of taxes imposed, the United States also differs
from most other industrialized nations. Once again, looking at
1994, income taxes provided a comparatively high 44.6% of all
American government revenue.' Social security taxes provided
25.5%, sales and other consumption taxes 17.9%, and property
taxes 12%.4 Most other developed countries rely significantly
less on income taxes and significantly more on consumption
taxes. On average, for example, consumption taxes constituted
31.9% of the tax revenue of OECD countries in 1994, almost
twice the 17.9% in the United States.5 To a large extent, this
difference is explained by the widespread adoption of value-add-
ed taxes over the last thirty years throughout the industrialized
world, with the notable exception of the U.S.
Focusing now particularly on income taxes, the third and final
tax system attribute that I want to emphasize is the relationship
between the individual and corporate income taxes. The United
States continues to have a so-called classical system of income
taxation, under which income earned through corporations can
be taxed twice, once when earned by the corporation and again
on distribution to shareholders. Over the last thirty years, most
other developed countries have integrated their individual and
corporate income taxes into a single system that is intended to
eliminate or reduce this double burden.6
This brief international comparison of tax systems can be
summarized as follows: first, taxes in the U.S. are lower than in
other industrialized countries; second, the U.S. relies relatively
more on income taxes and less on consumption taxes than do
other industrialized countries; and, finally, the U.S. is one of
very few such countries that continues to levy individual and
corporate income taxes that are separate and cumulative.
Given that background, let me now turn to three versions of
tax reform in the U.S. In each case, I plan to focus on the intel-
3. See id. at 77.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., PETER A. HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION AND
ALLOCATING RIGHTS BETWEEN CoUNTRIES 561-789 (1996).
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lectual foundations of tax reform, the use of those ideas in the
political process, and the level of understanding of the ideas by
the tax paying public.
I. IMPROVING AN EXISTING TAX BASE
The first version of tax reform that I want to explore is the
regular work of improving an existing tax base. Given the rela-
tive importance of income taxation in the United States, it is not
surprising that "tax reform" in the U.S. generally has meant
refinement and improvement of the income tax.
The seminal American formulation of the concept of income
for these purposes is the celebrated definition articulated by the
University of Chicago economist Henry Simons in the 1930s.7
Given the centrality of what has come to be called the Haig-
Simons definition of income to our first version of tax reform, it
is worth quoting the concept in detail:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1)
the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2)
the change in the value of the store of property rights be-
tween the beginning and end of the period in question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding con-
sumption during the period to "wealth" at the end of the peri-
od and then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning. The sine
qua non of income is gain, as our courts have recognized in
their more lucid moments-and gain to someone during a
specified time interval.'
The key idea in this quite abstract formulation is that gains
or increases in wealth, from whatever source, constitute the
ideal personal income tax base, whether those gains are saved or
spent on current consumption. This idea is not, however, directly
translatable into an operational income tax, which has always
7. See Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV.
44, 47 n.7 (1967) (indicating that an earlier version of the concept was proposed by
George Schanz in Der Einkommensbegriff und die Einkommensteuergesetze, 13 FINANZ
ARCm[lv 1 (1896) and introduced into American discussion in THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX (R. Haig ed., 1921)).
8. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
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used transactions, such as the receipt of salary or sale of assets,
rather than mere changes in value, to trigger taxation.9
The Haig-Simons definition was thus but the beginning for our
first version of tax reform. The concept had to be translated into
operational terms to deal with questions such as the following:
(1) Should fringe benefits be taxed differently from salary
under an income tax?
(2) Should capital gains be taxed at a lower rate than other
income?
(3) How should capital cost recovery for machinery and equip-
ment be designed under an income tax?
(4) How should the income tax burden be affected by marital
or family status?
These and hundreds of similar questions have been addressed
in a remarkable outpouring of writing on income tax policy since
the end of the Second World War. One of the notable features of
this literature is that it has been a joint enterprise of economists
and lawyers in the government, in the universities, and in pri-
vate practice. For example, the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee published an important compendium of papers on "broaden-
ing the tax base" in 1959.0 Academic lawyers and economists
debated the merits of a "comprehensive tax base" in the
1960s." Important Treasury Department studies of tax reform
were published in 1969,12 1977, s and 1984.'4 The American
Bar Association Section of Taxation published an evaluation of
the proposed model "comprehensive income tax" in 1979."5 And
9. See I.R.C. § 61 (West Supp. 1997) (defining gross income in terms of
transactions that produce the income).
10. See SUBCOMM. ON TAX POLICY, JOINT COMM. ON THE ECON. REPORT, 84TH
CONG., FED. TAX POLICY FOR ECON. GROWTH AND STABILITY, (Joint Comm. Print
1955) (analyzing the focus of tax policies and the impact of taxation on income and
consumption).
11. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE? A
DEBATE (1968).
12. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS & SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 91ST CONG.,
TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS--U.S. TREASURY DEP'T pts. 1-4 (Comm. Print
1969).
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977).
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984).
15. See Special Comm. on Simplification, ABA, Evaluation of the Proposed Model
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the Brookings Institution organized a series of joint tax reform
conferences for economists and lawyers in the 1970s and
1980s. 6
As a result of all this intellectual activity, a broad consensus
developed among tax policy professionals about how the income
tax could be improved, given the assumption that income was to
be taxed. The short version of this consensus is that for reasons
of fairness, economic efficiency, and ease of administration, the
income tax should ideally make as few distinctions as possible
among different categories of income and expenditure. According
to the consensus, distinctions generally are to be avoided if they
treat similarly situated taxpayers differently, if they distort
economic decisions, or if they unduly complicate legal rules or
business transactions.
The fullest expression of this view was probably the character-
ization by Harvard Law School Professor Stanley Surrey, then
serving as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy in
the Johnson Administration, of deviations from the ideal as "tax
expenditures." 7 Surrey's faith in the consensus view was so
strong that he thought legislative deviations from that view
should be analyzed as the equivalent of tax receipts that had
been collected and then spent on tax-favored activities.
One result of all this work by tax policy specialists was that
whenever political conditions ripened, there were legislative
ideas already available for tax reform in the sense of improving
the income tax by eliminating distinctions among different kinds
of income. One important example was the Tax Reform Act of
1969,8 which followed Surrey's tenure at Treasury, and which
eliminated many tax preferences.
Comprehensive Income Tax, 32 TAX LAW. 563 (1979).
16. See, e.g., COMIPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977)
(describing methods to broaden the tax base and attempts to lower tax rates);
WORLD TAX REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1988) (discussing
tax reform in other countries and the United States's reaction to such measures).
17. For the most complete development of the concept by its originator, see STAN-
LEY S. SuRREY & PAUL R. MCDONALD, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).
18. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (amended 1986).
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The most recent example of tax reform in this sense is the
Tax Reform Act of 1986."9 Prior to 1986, the highest individual
tax rate was 50%, and the general corporate rate was 46%.20
Those nominal rates, however, were mitigated by a series of
special provisions, including accelerated depreciation for invest-
ment in machinery and equipment, as well as preferential treat-
ment of capital gains on certain investments. The tax advantag-
es for some investment activities were marketed as "tax shel-
ters" to investors who had little interest in the tax-preferred
business other than the tax advantage.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Democrats interested in broad-
ening the tax base united with Republicans interested in reduc-
ing tax rates to implement the fullest application to date of the
first version of tax reform." A plethora of special provisions
were eliminated, including tax shelters for individual investors
from outside tax-preferred businesses. The drive to broaden the
tax base by reducing distinctions even led to the elimination of
preferential treatment of capital gains, a mainstay of the tax
system since 1921. The Act set the top individual rate on all
realized income, including capital gains, at 28%." The 1986
legislation, which reflected the typically American penchant for
low taxes, initiated a process of reform in many other countries
that resulted in lower income tax rates abroad.
The year 1986 marked the high-water mark of the first and
traditional American version of tax reform. The top statutory
rate for individuals has increased to 39.6%,3 while the capital
gains rate has remained at 28%, reintroducing a preference that
congressional leaders have pledged to enlarge during this Con-
gress. President Clinton's budget proposals similarly include a
series of new tax expenditures, particularly for education.' The
19. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
20. See § 804, 83 Stat. 487; I.R.C. § 11(b) (.954).
21. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987) (describ-
ing the bipartisan efforts to pass the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
22. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (West 1988) (defining applicable rates for tax years before
1987).
23. Effective rates can be higher due, for example, to the phase-out of personal
exemptions and itemized deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 68, 151(d) (West Supp. 1997).
24. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PRO-
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traditional view of tax reform is, however, far from moribund.
Legislation proposed by Representative Richard Gephardt, the
Minority Leader of the House, and a likely Democratic presiden-
tial candidate in 2000, is probably the most prominent manifes-
tation of this view today.'
What conclusions can we draw about the first version of tax
reform, which has been so important in the United States over
the last half-century? As one would expect, the process of im-
provement of the income tax has been continuing and gradual.
Among tax policy experts, there has been time to work out the
relevant ideas in some detail, allowing a considerable consensus
to develop. Among political leaders, there has been regular inter-
est in the subject and episodic implementation, particularly
when reform could be coupled with rate reduction. Finally, given
the long history of the U.S. income tax, public understanding of
these issues has been fairly widespread.
II. INTRODUCING A NEW TAX
I want now to turn to a second version of tax reform. Rather
than the incremental improvement of an existing tax, this sec-
ond version involves the revolutionary introduction of an entire-
ly new tax. The last time such a revolution occurred in the U.S.
was the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution in 1913, which authorized the enactment of the federal
income tax that I have been discussing so far.
As you recall from the 1996 presidential election, there are
those in public life who argue that the moment has now arrived
for another such revolution. They would repeal the income tax
enacted in 1913 and replace it with something else. As Steve
Forbes put it in the announcement of his presidential campaign:
"[Sicrap the income tax. Don't fiddle with it. Junk it. Throw it
out. Bury it. Replace it with a pro-growth, pro-family tax cut
VISIONS CONTNUED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET PROPOSAL 4-16
(Comm. Print 1997).
25. See ITax Warfare,' INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 13, 1995, at B1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (printing excerpts from Richard A. Gephardt, A
Democratic Plan for America's Economy: Toward a Fairer, Simpler Tax Code, Re-
marks Before the Center for National Policy (July 6, 1995)).
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that lowers tax rates to 17 percent across the board." 6 Al-
though the rhetoric deployed in this version of tax reform is
more revolutionary, this second version shares with the first the
American preference for low taxes.
If we junk the income tax, what is to replace it? Recall that the
U.S. differs from other developed countries in the relative em-
phasis given income taxation as compared with consumption
taxation. Although sometimes packaged differently, the leading
proposals for revolutionary change are essentially proposals to
eliminate that American specificity by replacing the federal in-
come tax with a consumption tax. Before considering the details
of these proposals, let me briefly sketch their intellectual history.
You will recall that the key idea of the Haig-Simons definition
of income is that individuals should be taxed on all income,
whether saved or spent on current consumption. There is a long-
standing, alternative intellectual tradition, according to which
income saved should be omitted from the tax base. Thomas
Hobbes so argued on the grounds that income saved was left in
the "common pool" of society, thereby providing capital that
would increase both future production and the future productivi-
ty of workers." For Hobbes, it made sense to tax citizens only
when they withdrew resources from this common pool. The yard-
stick for measuring economic well-being for tax purposes would
therefore be spending, or consumption, rather than earnings, or
income.
John Stuart Mill argued for a similar result on the ground
that it was double taxation to tax a wage-earner on both the
wages received and the income produced by investing those
wages." The American economist Irving Fisher made the same
point in terms of present value: the taxes paid by a worker who
immediately consumes all his income will be lower in present
value than the taxes paid by a worker who saves to consume in
26. Steve Forbes, Flat Tax Flap: GOP Candidate Promotes 17% Rate as Pro-
Growth, Pro-Family, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 18, 1996, at El, available in
1996 WL 6436132 (reprinting excerpts from his Presidential Announcement Speech,
Remarks Before the National Press Club (Sept. 22, 1995)).
27. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 226 (M. Oakeshott ed., 1960).
28. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. V, ch. I, § 4
(Laughlin ed., 1898).
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a later period, because the saver will owe additional taxes on the
income produced by his savings. Fisher concluded that "such a
system of taxation is clearly unjust and discourages the saver,
while it encourages the spendthrift."29
In 1955, the British economist Nicholas Kaldor published a
book entitled An Expenditure Tax that rekindled interest in
these ideas." Ever since, there has been a lively debate in the
tax policy literature about the relative merits of income and con-
sumption taxes."'
Before turning to that debate, I want to point out that there
are two principal ways to implement a tax on consumption rath-
er than income. The first is transactional. A tax on all retail
sales, would, for example, tax annual consumption at a flat rate.
The value-added taxes (VATs) that have swept the rest of the
world in the last thirty years accomplish the same result by
collecting a portion of the tax at each stage of production. One
disadvantage of a retail sales tax or VAT is that it is difficult to
personalize. Rates cannot be set as a function of an individual's
personal or economic situation because the tax is levied on sales,
rather than individuals.
The second method of implementing a consumption tax over-
comes this difficulty. Recall that under the Haig-Simons defini-
tion, income can be thought of as savings plus consumption. Ac-
cordingly, personal consumption could be taxed by starting with
income and then subtracting all savings."2 This personal con-
sumption or expenditure tax could be graduated or adjusted for
family circumstances, as is the income tax.
29. IRVING FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 253 (1906).
30. NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955).
31. See, e.g., WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? (Joseph A.
Pechman ed., 1980).
32. For a discussion of the design of such a tax, see DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTAN-
GLING THE INCOME TAX 75-99 (1986); INSTITUTE OF FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE
AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (1978); KALDOR, supra note 30; U.S. DEPT OF THE
TREASURY, supra note 14; William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Michael J. Graetz, Implement-
ing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979); Special Comm.
on Simplification, supra note 15.
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Given these alternative implementations, 3 consumption tax
proponents have argued for the superiority of their tax using the
three traditional norms of tax policy: fairness, economic efficien-
cy, and administrative simplicity. The consumption tax is said to
be fairer because it does not discriminate against taxpayers, like
Fisher's savers, who prefer to defer their consumption. It is said
to be economically superior because it does not reduce welfare or
discourage savings to the same extent as an income tax, and it
is said to be simpler because many of the complexities of calcu-
lating income could be avoided. One such simplification would be
the elimination of the income tax concept of basis, which would
always be zero if all savings were deductible.
Income tax proponents have responded that the consumption
tax would be regressive and therefore unfair, because higher
income individuals save more. They further argue that the evi-
dence that the income tax actually reduces savings is weak. And
they suggest that the income tax could also be much simplified if
the first version of tax reform were pursued more assiduously.
Given this background, let us now turn to the two most prom-
inent proposals for radical change by replacing the American
emphasis on income taxation with consumption taxation. The
first is the "Flat Tax," which was much talked about during the
33. Under certain circumstances, a third method for implementing a consumption
tax would be simply to exempt capital income from the income tax. This approach
best can be illustrated with a numerical example. Suppose that you have $1000 in
wages. You plan to put the wages in a savings account and consume the annual
10% interest return. Suppose further that we wanted to levy a 30% tax on your
annual consumption. Under the first alternative described in the text, you could put
the $1000 in the savings account and would have $100 in annual interest and $70
in annual after-tax consumption, having paid a retail sales or value-added tax on
your purchases. Under the second alternative, inclusion of your wages in the person-
al consumption tax base would be offset by the deduction of your savings, so you
also would have $1000 in the savings account, which would produce $100 subject to
tax each year, again leaving you with $70 in after-tax consumption. Now suppose
that capital income was simply excluded from the income tax base. Your wages
would be taxed, so you would only have $700 to put in the savings account. But the
annual interest on the account would not be taxed, so you would again have $70 in
annual consumption after all taxes. This equivalence leads some analysts to argue
that a personal consumption tax can be equivalent in present value to a wage tax if
tax rates are unchanged. The other conditions necessary for the equivalence to hold
are discussed in RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 262, 266-67
(1959); Graetz, supra note 32, at 1601-06.
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last presidential election and which has been introduced in Con-
gress by Representative Dick Armey, the Majority Leader of the
House of Representatives.' The second is the "USA Tax,"
which was developed under the sponsorship of Senators Pete
Dominici and Sam Nunn.35
The Flat Tax was originally advanced by two Stanford aca-
demics, Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka.5 There are two parts
to the tax, a business tax and an individual tax. Under the first,
all businesses, whether incorporated or not, would include all
sales in the tax base and deduct all purchases from other busi-
nesses, including purchases of capital equipment. Pausing for a
moment at this point, we can ask what is the aggregate base of
such a tax? Because all purchases from businesses are also sales
by businesses, deductions by the purchasing businesses are
offset exactly by inclusions of the selling businesses. Hence the
only transactions that are taxed are sales by businesses to
nonbusinesses, i.e., retail sales. As far as we have gone, the
aggregate base of the Flat Tax is simply retail sales. Indeed, tax
specialists would classify the tax as a "subtraction-method" val-
ue-added tax.
There is, however, an additional wrinkle to the Flat Tax. Busi-
nesses can also deduct wages, which are the only receipts taxed
to wage-earners. If these businesses' deductions are fully offset by
wage-earners' inclusions, what is the purpose of this wrinkle,
given a flat rate of taxation? It is to allow an exemption for a
certain amount of wages, in response to the objection that value-
added taxes are regressive for lower-income taxpayers. The Flat
Tax is accordingly the equivalent of a tax on value-added, plus a
government grant to eligible wage-earners to offset the burden of
the tax. If you do not remember the tax being discussed this way
during the 1996 presidential campaign, it is not because you have
forgotten the discussion. Rather, the candidates vaguely referred
34. See H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. (1995).
35. For the most complete description of the proposal by its sponsors, see USA
Tax System: Description and Explanation of the Unlimited Savings Allowance Income
Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1485 (1995). The legislative version is S. 722, 104th
Cong., which was introduced by Senators Pete Domenici, Sam Nunn, and Bob
Kerrey on April 25, 1995.
36. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
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to a Flat Tax, which most of the press and therefore the public
assumed was an income tax with flat rates.
The second prominent proposal for radical tax reform is the
"USA Tax," which is named after its principal innovation, an
Unlimited Savings Allowance. Again there are two taxes, one for
businesses and one for individuals. As under the Flat Tax, the
business tax is a subtraction-method VAT, but without the wrin-
kle of a deduction for wages. At the individual level, the design-
ers of the tax have tried to implement a graduated personal con-
sumption tax by starting with the income tax base and then per-
mitting an unlimited deduction for all savings. The USA Tax
would thus levy two taxes, one flat and one graduated, on the
same general base, personal consumption.
I now want to compare the Flat Tax and USA Tax on several
grounds. First, consider rates, which are low and not graduated
under the Flat Tax. Under the USA Tax, they are graduated for
individuals, with top rates near those of the current income tax
rates. What explains this difference? The Flat Tax assumes that
all activity in the economy, including legal education at William
& Mary Law School, will be subject to a tax rate of, say, 17%.
The USA Tax assumes that many of the activities subject to
favorable treatment under the current income tax will also be
favored under a consumption tax, so its rates are necessarily
higher.
Second, consider transition from the existing income tax to a
consumption tax. It might help to have in mind a retired wage-
earner who is living off savings from her working days. Under
an income tax, she would be taxed during retirement only to the
extent she earned additional income or withdrew previously un-
taxed amounts from tax-favored pension plans. The income tax
concept of basis assures that she would not be taxed again on
income taxed during her working days. Now suppose that a con-
sumption tax is substituted for the income tax. Should our
retiree's income tax basis protect her from taxation under the
consumption tax? If our answer is no, she will be taxed twice on
the same gain. If our answer is yes, then consumption tax rates
will have to be higher to make up the lost revenue. The Flat Tax
opts for the first solution, which would involve a major shift of
tax burden from younger to older Americans. Not surprisingly,
TAX REFORM
this aspect of the Flat Tax was not highlighted during the 1996
presidential campaign in Florida. The USA Tax avoids this shift
in tax burden by opting for the second choice, which is another
reason its rates are higher than under a Flat Tax.
Now consider international transactions. Should a sales or
value-added tax be levied where the item is purchased (on an
"origin" basis) or where it is used (on a "destination" basis)? In
general, retail sales taxes and VATs are levied on a destination
basis, which is the choice made by the USA Tax. The Flat Tax
would, on the other hand, apply only to value added in the Unit-
ed States. An American-made car would be subject to taxation in
the U.S. on its full value, whereas a foreign-made car sold in the
U.S. would be subject to taxation in the U.S. on only the profit
made by the American retailer. Although economists think that
currency exchange rates would adjust for such differences, it is
unlikely that U.S. car manufacturers would agree. Not surpris-
ingly, this aspect of the Flat Tax was not highlighted during the
1996 presidential campaign in Michigan. Once again, the press
and public seemed quite unaware of how the proposed tax would
actually work.
Finally, consider complexity. The Flat Tax is simple, but that
is in part because many of the most difficult problems, such as
intergenerational and international issues, have been assumed
away. The USA Tax, on the other hand, is quite complicated,
largely because it stumbles on a key problem of consumption tax
design, which is that consumption out of borrowed funds should
be taxed. This result is unsurprising under a retail sales tax or a
VAT, because the tax is due whether the purchases are funded
with wages, savings, or borrowings.
Under a personal consumption tax, which starts with income
and subtracts savings, the result is less automatic, because bor-
rowed money is not included in taxable income. Under the Haig-
Simons definition we began with, borrowed funds are not in-
come, because they do not increase the borrower's net wealth. If
we want to tax consumption, however, borrowed funds have to
be included in the tax base. If those funds were saved, then the
net tax result would be zero, because the deduction for savings
would offset the inclusion of borrowings. The designers of the
USA Tax thought, perhaps correctly, that the American taxpay-
19971
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ing public would not understand the inclusion of borrowed funds
in the tax base, so they constructed a very complicated and prob-
ably unworkable system to limit deductions to amounts saved in
excess of borrowings."
Given President Clinton's reelection, neither the Flat Tax nor
the USA Tax is very likely to be enacted during the next few
years. But, these ideas are no less moribund than is the first
version of tax reform. I would expect that there will be
presidential candidates in 2000 who will again propose revolu-
tionary tax reform along these lines.
What conclusions can we draw regarding this second version
of tax reform, which seems to have become important in presi-
dential politics? Like the first version of tax reform, this version
is based solidly on a longstanding intellectual tradition, which
prefers consumption taxes to income taxes. Given the traditional
American emphasis on income taxation, however, there has not
always been time for tax policy specialists to develop the rele-
vant ideas in the detail necessary for actual legislation in the
U.S. Among political leaders, there has been episodic interest,
particularly on the part of leaders who want to distinguish
themselves by proposing a revolutionary form of tax reduction.
Indeed, these proposals would replace one form of American
specificity (heavy reliance on income taxes) with another (virtual
elimination of income taxes), while other countries continue to
depend on a mix of taxes. Finally, among the press and general
public, there seems to be a high degree of confusion about what
is actually under discussion.
III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TAXES
Let me now turn to a third version of tax reform, which in-
volves rationalization of the relationships between two tax bases.
A number of possibilities come to mind, such as the relationship
between income and social security taxes, or between state and
federal taxes. I want to focus today on the relationship between
the federal corporate and individual income taxes.
37. See generally Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Proposal for an "Unlimited Savings
Allowance," 68 TAX NOTES 1103 (1995) (discussing the main aspects of the USA Tax
and criticizing certain elements of the tax).
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As I mentioned earlier, the United States has long had a
"classical" income tax system, under which income is taxed to
corporations and shareholders as distinct taxpayers. Interest
paid to suppliers of corporate debt capital is deductible by the
corporation, but dividends paid to shareholders are not. Taxable
income earned by a corporation and then distributed to individu-
al shareholders as a dividend is thus taxed twice, once to the
corporation, and again to the shareholder on receipt of the divi-
dend. As a result, the current regime is often characterized as a
"double tax" system.
The actual U.S. tax system is considerably more complex. For
example, some income earned through corporate enterprise is
taxed only once, at the corporate level. This is the result for
corporate taxable income distributed as dividends to tax-exempt
shareholders, such as pension funds and charitable endowments.
Other income earned through corporate enterprise is taxed only
once, at the investor level. This occurs when corporate earnings
are distributed as deductible interest payments to taxable
debtholders. Finally, some income earned through corporate
enterprise is not taxed in the U.S. at either the corporate or
investor level. This is the result for deductible interest paid to
certain foreign and tax-exempt holders of U.S. corporate debt. 8
Accordingly, corporate income is sometimes taxed twice in the
U.S., sometimes once, and sometimes not at all.
The current U.S. system of taxing corporate income distorts
several economic and financial choices, of which the following
four are usually considered the most important.
1. U.S. investors are discouraged from investing in new corpo-
rate equity because of the additional burden of the corporate tax,
distorting the allocation of capital between corporate and non-
corporate investment.
2. U.S. corporations are encouraged to finance new projects by
issuing debt or using retained earnings, rather than by issuing
new stock, in order to avoid an additional level of tax. The re-
sulting higher debt levels may increase the costs of financial
distress.
38. See I.R.C. § 871(h) (West Supp. 1997) (exempting interest paid to foreign hold-
ers of portfolio debt).
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3. There can be a tax incentive to retain or distribute corpo-
rate earnings, depending on the relationships among corporate,
shareholder, and capital gains tax rates. For example, if the
corporate and capital gains rates are sufficiently low relative to
shareholder rates on ordinary income, the tax system encourag-
es retention of earnings by U.S. corporations to take advantage
of the lower rates.
4. The tax system encourages U.S. corporations to distribute
earnings in tax-preferred transactions, such as stock repurchas-
es that give rise to capital gains, rather than by paying divi-
dends.
"Integration" of the corporate and individual income taxes has
come to mean eliminating the double burden of the corporate
and individual income taxes, where it exists, and substituting a
system in which investor and corporate taxes are interrelated in
a manner that eliminates or reduces the foregoing distortions."9
The goal is to produce a uniform levy on capital income, whether
earned through corporate enterprise or not.
The basic argument for integration is economic. The classical
corporate tax increases the cost of capital for U.S. companies,
discourages new equity investments in corporate enterprise, and
encourages the issuance of corporate debt. According to the
Treasury, the U.S. tax burden on corporate capital, as compared
with residential housing, has resulted in a much lower ratio of
corporate to residential investment in the U.S. than in other in-
dustrialized countries. 0
Thirty years ago, the corporate tax systems of most other
major developed countries were similar to ours. In the last three
decades, however, most of our major trading partners have fully
or partially integrated their individual and corporate income
taxes, usually through a shareholder credit for previously paid
39. The literature on integration is vast. For a discussion of two recent proposals
(with extensive bibliographies) for integration in the United States, see ALVIN C.
WARREN, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT. INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL COR-
PORATE INCOME TAXES: REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (Ameri-
can Law Institute, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 ALI STUDY]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
SURY, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYS-
TEMS-TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter 1992 TREASURY REPORT].
40. See 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 39, at 5.
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corporate taxes. In so doing, they have reduced the economic
distortions that continue to exist in the U.S.41
While integration has been discussed periodically in the U.S.,
this discussion has not been identified with any political party
or movement. The Treasury Department has developed integra-
tion proposals in both Democratic and Republican administra-
tions, and the House of Representatives included a small step to-
ward integration in its version of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Professional groups, including the American Law Institute, have
also developed proposals to eliminate the double taxation of
corporate income in the U.S.42
One might have thought that the reaction of the U.S. corpo-
rate community to such proposals would be unbridled enthusi-
asm, particularly in a period of increasing international competi-
tion and given the American predilection for low taxes. In fact,
with rare exceptions, corporate management remarkably has
been uninterested in proposals that would eliminate the double
taxation of corporate income distributed to shareholders as divi-
dends. Given the choice, corporate management seems to prefer
corporate tax reductions through reduced rates or accelerated
capital cost deductions, rather than structural changes that
would reduce the biases of our corporate tax.
I cannot fully explain this disinterest. Some analysts suggest
that even in the competitive American capital markets, corpo-
rate management simply does not act as a steward of sharehold-
er interests.43 On this view, management may actually prefer
some versions of the double tax, which discourage the distribu-
tion of corporate income, providing management with a pool of
capital free of the rigors of the capital markets. Another possible
explanation is that well-informed taxpayers can mitigate the
41. Countries with fully or partially integrated tax systems include Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. For a recent comparison
of integration systems, see HARRIS, supra note 6, at 561-789.
42. See 1993 ALI STUDY, supra note 39; TAX DIV., AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED
PUB. AccoUNTANTs, STATEMENT OF TAX PoLIcY 10, INTEGRATION OF THE CORPORATE
AND SHAREHOLDER TAX SYSTEMS (1993).
43. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 368 (1995) (suggesting that the gap between corporate
ownership and management affects the integration debate).
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burden of the double tax. One important development in this
regard has been the creation by state legislatures in recent
years of a new business form, the Limited Liability Company,
which allows closely held companies to obtain the advantages of
limited liability without being subject to the federal income tax
on corporations." Even public companies, which cannot escape
the corporate tax in this way, have been more aggressive in
finding ways to distribute earnings as deductible interest pay-
ments or as share purchases taxed as capital gains.45 Finally,
some would argue that much of the burden of the existing tax
system has already been capitalized in share prices, meaning
that at least some of the burden may have been borne by previ-
ous owners of shares. In spite of these explanations, it is some-
thing of a mystery why the United States remains one of the
very few industrialized countries that has not integrated its
individual and corporate income taxes.
In the absence of support from corporate management, there
has been very little interest in corporate tax integration on the
part of political leaders. The third version of tax reform is thus
characterized by a detailed elaboration of the relevant ideas by
tax policy specialists, disinterest on the part of political leaders,
and, I think it is fair to say, almost complete ignorance on the
part of the general public.
IV. CONCLUSION
To summarize, I have spoken today about three versions of
tax reform: improvement of an existing tax, replacement of an
existing tax by something radically different, and rationalization
of the relationships between taxes. In the United States, those
three versions of tax reform have been manifest in the long-
standing movement to broaden the income tax base, in recent
interest in substituting consumption taxation for income taxa-
44. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Ex-
posing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393 (1996) (discussing
the benefits of the Limited Liability Company for tax reform).
45. See, e.g., Laurie Bagwell & John B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to Sharehold-
ers, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 129 (1989) (discussing the problems with using noncash divi-
dends and advocating the increased use of cash distributions as a replacement).
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tion, and in proposals to integrate the individual and corporate
income taxes. In all three cases, the American preference for
lower taxes has been manifest.
Tax policy experts have served an important function in devel-
oping the ideas necessary for all three versions of tax reform.
However, the expert tax policy community has sometimes done
an inadequate job of communicating the content of these ideas to
the public (particularly about current proposals for revolutionary
reform) and to the country's corporate and political leadership
(particularly about important relationships between individual
and corporate taxes).
Happily, it is not too late to correct these deficiencies. All
three versions of tax reform remain unfinished. And for those of
you who are interested in the revolutionary version, the next
presidential election is only a few years away.
